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27 May 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT: Long-Range Requirements for Satellite
Image-Forming Sensors

Following today's meeting and discussion of the draft minute submitted by the Chairman, the undersigned has reviewed the original submission and has noted some of the points made by the members. He suggests that as a basis for your revisions and perhaps to reduce the time needed to discuss this point at the COMOR meeting on 3 June, you study the attached revised draft. This is a working paper primarily of pertinence to those attending this morning's meeting and is being given limited distribution.

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Executive Secretary

Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Attachment:

Subject paper

Copy 1 State TCO
2 DIA TCO
3 OACSI TCO
4 ONI TCO
5 AFNIN TCO
6 NSA TCO
7 NRO TCO

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Long-Range Requirements for Satellite Image-Forming Sensors

1. The Chairman expressed his concern at the present state of COMOR's work on the above subject and the following pertinent points were noted and discussed:

a. The Board on 24 March 1965 approved the current requirements for satellite image-forming sensors (USIB-D-41.14/229; COMOR-D-13/43) including Tab A which was a statement of numbers of targets by category and frequency.

b. Tab A is a necessary base for the PWG to provide target cards on specific targets with their coordinates. This NRO has requested ^{this} in order for it to run CPXs and studies looking toward a judgment on the number of missions necessary to meet the Board's requirements (see the discussions in these COMOR minutes--COMOR-M-310, paragraph 6, and COMOR-M-314, paragraph 18). The PWG has been unable to complete this task inasmuch as the DIA found some inaccuracies in Tab A which required revision.

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
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 explained that General Carroll had stated

that it was imperative that Tab A be entirely accurate in defining targets and insuring that the number to be covered and the frequency with which they are to be covered is precise in all respects. In response to a


question on the need for a precise Tab A rather than a continuing revision of targets,  explained


that NRO needed this for an in-house study required by Dr. McMillan pertinent to the management of the present program and procurement of photographic reconnaissance capabilities in the future.

c. On 6 January 1965 (see USIB-D-41.13/18;

COMOR-D-13/31) the Board requested COMOR to examine more fully the meaning of higher resolution in terms of intelligence information. At that time the


Chairman, COMOR took to the Chairman of the Board two alternative methods of making the study, his own

and one proposed by  of DIA. The Chairman

of the Board preferred  approach to the

study of the meaning of higher resolution. This was

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reported to COMOR, and PWG prepared the Essential Elements of Information. These were submitted to NPIC for an NPIC technical analysis. Upon completion of its study NPIC distributed it to the COMOR, and the FWG was then tasked to analyze the EEIs with reference to the number of targets and frequencies expressed in Tab A as requested by [REDACTED]. Subsequently, the Chairman, PWG advised COMOR that DIA had a revision to the EEIs. These revisions have not been received. It was the opinion of the Chairman that conclusion of analysis of the EEIs is essential to COMOR's examination of long-range requirements. [REDACTED] maintained that the NFIC review was performed without the final benefit of FTD, NAVPIC, and other similar detailed studies, and that these are needed.

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d. The Chairman also noted that [REDACTED] had suggested that there were other portions of the long-range requirements which need not be held up because of the EEIs. However, upon further examination it appeared that these studies which were underway at NPIC and elsewhere would have to be available before any useful drafting could begin.

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


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
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
In reply to a question from  regarding the so-called NPIC studies,  explained that these were not official NPIC studies but that he made reference to certain work being done within NPIC. He reaffirmed that completion of all of these is essential to the long-range paper.

2. The Chairman, COMOR requested the DIA member again to review the progress of work on: Tab A, the EEIs, and ^{the} other studies and to report to COMOR the earliest date it may expect to receive these and begin again its work on long-range requirements. He noted that COMOR would welcome receiving these piecemeal if on that basis it could get on with its task.




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29 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: Launch of the CORONA-J Mission, 1009

1. On 23 July (COMOR-D-56/39, [REDACTED], COMOR recommended to you that the NRO be advised that 1009 should be delayed until the results of 1008 were assessed, the earliest date for the conclusion of that study being 1 August, and second that [REDACTED] should be launched as soon as possible.

3. The following new developments are brought to your attention:

a. COMOR has now finished its targeting on the basis of 1008 except for consideration of a "holiday" map on the second bucket of 1008. This still is due on 1 August.

b. The NRO has examined the new targeting provided by COMOR (minus the "holiday" results of 1008-2) and has advised that no new programming is necessary.

c. The NRO also advises that the 1009-J could be launched on about 4 August.

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6. Recommendations:

a. That the NRO be requested now to proceed to launch 1009 at the earliest date on the basis of the present programs and use the updated "holiday" to assist in management after launch.

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*Recommendation
approved by DCI
729 July 1964
signed*

James Q. Reber
Chairman

Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

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24 July 1964

COMOR notified by COMOR-D-56/41

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

SUBJECT: Launch of Second CORONA "J" Mission in July

REFERENCE: Memorandum for Chairman, USIB from Dr. McMillan,
dated 21 July 1964

1. This letter responds to your inquiry in reference on whether the launch of Mission 1009-J should occur on or about 28 July or should be delayed to permit incorporation of programming changes which might result from further readout of recent missions.

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John A. McCone
Director

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

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OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY

21 JUL 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE
BOARD

SUBJECT: Launch of Second CORONA "J" Mission in July

Preparations are proceeding for the launch of CORONA "J" Mission 1009 on 28 July. This mission, the second "J" mission for July, is programmed primarily against targets in Soviet Union with capability of covering South China targets if needed (and if the predicted weather is favorable).

In view of recent CORONA experience (six successful recoveries since 1 June), is the launch of this mission on or about 28 July desired, or should it be delayed to permit incorporation of programming changes which might result from further readout of recent missions?

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Brockway McMillan
Director
(S) National Reconnaissance Office

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21 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Preparation of Long-Range Requirements
for Satellite Reconnaissance: Status
and Chronology

1. On 24 April 1963 the Board considered COMOR recommendations on long-term requirements for photographic and SIGINT satellite reconnaissance. COMOR had reached agreement on the SIGINT requirements but was in disagreement on the photo requirements. The Board considered that it was desirable for the Board prior to further consideration of the requirements to request the views of the NRO, especially with respect to the technical and operational implications of the requirements statements. This request was transmitted on the same date.

2. In about mid-September the NRO responded with comments. The tone and substance of the NRO comments were unsatisfactory to the Chairman of the Board, and the paper was returned for revamping. The revised paper was transmitted to the Chairman of the Board on 30 October 1963.

3. In mid-September the Chairman of the Board instructed me to visit Dr. McMillan to discuss possible next steps to get up off dead center with regard to the requirements. I reported on 17 September that Dr. McMillan and I had agreed for COMOR to now engage in discussions with a senior representative of the NRO to make a genuine effort to understand each other in order that COMOR could recommend to the Board in the most appropriate fashion the requirements for representing the needs of the community and in a context which would be useful to the NRO.

4. On 7 October and 31 October COMOR held two meetings with Mr. Kiefer as Dr. McMillan's representative. At the second meeting a copy of Dr. McMillan's memorandum of 30 October was available. Seemingly, some progress was being

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made. However, at this point the DIA advised that [] had instructed the Defense Intelligence Agency to submit to him, for approval before being distributed outside of the Department of Defense, the Department's long range requirements for satellite reconnaissance. The Chairman, COMOR queried the DIA representative from time to time on when the DOD would be able to discuss the requirements. At one point he was advised that [] had seen and returned the requirements for further revision. After [] left the Department of Defense, the same situation pertained with regard to Secretary Vance. On 20 March 1964 the Chairman, COMOR advised the Chairman of the Board of this state of affairs.

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5. From 20 March until the present the Chairman, COMOR has repeatedly inquired of the DIA representative whether DIA was prepared to discuss these requirements. The latter made clear that General Carroll was fully aware of the problem and had repeatedly sought through [] office to get permission to proceed on the matter.

[]
James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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